Morality

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"...a lot of human behaviors are – to be blunt – moronic. Try, for instance, to imagine an 'authoritative' ethics textbook whose principles were based on what most people actually *do*."

— David Foster Wallace (2006, p. 89)

Since 2001 research in personality and social psychology (as well as cognitive psychology, neuroscience, sociology, and experimental philosophy) has seen an explosion of interest in moral thought and behavior (see Haidt, 2007, on the "new synthesis in moral psychology"). This explosion can be traced back to two influential papers published within days of each other in September 2001: Joshua Greene and colleagues' neuroimaging study involving trolley-type moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2001) and Jonathan Haidt's review paper on the central role of emotion and intuition in moral judgment (Haidt, 2001). Since then, the number of scholarly articles available in the PsycINFO database addressing either "moral judgment" or "moral behavior" in the 21st century (11,173 works published 2001-2016) has already far surpassed that of the entire 20th century (7,539 works published 1900-1999).

While moral psychology is flourishing, it remains internally divided in several respects. As social/personality psychology as a whole remains methodologically divisible into the "two

streams" of individual differences and situational effects (Cronbach, 1957; Tracy, Robins, & Sherman, 2009), this is particularly stark in the case of moral psychology (see Graham, Meindl, & Beall, 2012, for a call to integrate these streams). As Tracy et al. (2009) point out, this division occurs both conceptually (focus on stable within-person factors vs. changing facets of situations) and methodologically (focus on correlational vs. experimental designs). An additional cleavage in moral psychology can be found in the target of inquiry: moral psychology may be defined as the study of moral thought and behavior, but it is most often the study of *either* moral thought *or* moral behavior. A recent meta-analysis of the relations between moral judgment and moral behavior found that although there were substantial empirical literatures for each of these, the overlap area of studies containing measures of both moral judgment and moral behavior was surprisingly small (Johnson, Wood, & Graham, 2016).

Moreover, the sub-subfields of moral judgment and moral behavior can both be considered a "ravine" (Deaux & Snyder, 2012) in that they contain few combinations of personality and social psychology approaches (Graham et al., 2012). Studies of moral judgment and moral behavior both tend to examine either individual/cultural differences or situational determinants, rarely examining both to identify person-by-situation interactions. This chapter proceeds along the two major cleavages in moral psychology, covering cultural and individual differences in moral judgment, situational effects on moral judgment, cultural and individual differences in moral behavior, and situational effects on moral behavior. But we also highlight extant evidence of person-situation interactions for both moral judgment and moral behavior. Finally, we map out several future directions for moral psychology, including further integration of the two streams of methodological approaches, more investigations of the complex relations

between moral judgment and moral (or immoral) behavior, and expansion of empirical inquiries to new samples, new methodologies, and new moral phenomena.

Cultural and Individual Differences in Moral Judgment

The scientific study of morality in the 20th century was dominated by the developmental study of moral reasoning, first introduced by Jean Piaget (1932/1997), most influentially developed by Lawrence Kohlberg (1969), and continued in the work of neo-Kohlbergians today (see Killen & Smetana, 2006, and Lapsley & Carlo, 2014, for reviews). In this line of work the central individual difference of interest was the relative sophistication of children's deliberations about right and wrong. In *The Moral Judgment of the Child* (1932/1997), Piaget observed boys playing games of marbles, and described a continuous cognitive-developmental progression in their understanding and application of rules, from motor to egocentric to cooperation to codification. Kohlberg (1969) developed this description further into a larger theory of distinct developmental stages of moral reasoning more generally: Stage 1—obey rules to avoid punishment; Stage 2—follow reciprocal fairness rules for mutual benefit; Stage 3—internalize rules and conventions of the family and peer group; Stage 4—internalize norms and laws of society; Stage 5—reason about the principles behind social laws; and Stage 6—reason purely from these principles, regardless of social or cultural norms.

While Piaget proposed that all children progressed through the stages of rule application eventually, Kohlberg held that adults could systematically differ in which moral reasoning stage they had progressed to – a small percentage make it to Stage 6, more people only make it to Stage 5, and some remain at Stage 4 or even Stage 3. Thus individual differences in reasoning about justice could be described in developmental terms, even for people of the same age. For this reason Kohlberg's model was critiqued as being ideologically biased, as liberal values of

egalitarianism and equality were cast as more advanced and mature than conservative values of tradition and authority (Emler, Renwick, & Malone, 1983). Individuals differ dramatically in how they prioritize their values (both moral and self-interested), from benevolence and tradition to achievement and hedonism (see Feldman, 2003 and Schwartz, 1992 for reviews).

The most consequential critique of Kohlberg came from Carol Gilligan, and this critique established gender as a crucial factor of interest in moral psychology. In *A Different Voice* (1982), Gilligan critiqued the Piaget-Kohlberg tradition's restriction of the moral domain to reasoning about fairness and justice. She argued that this conception left out more "feminine" aspects of morality, such as compassion, nurturance, and empathy. After a period of debate the Kohlbergian school came to largely embrace this critique, including both justice and care in its most widely-used definition of morality as "prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare pertaining to how people ought to relate to each other" (Turiel, 1983).

Research has subsequently revealed a host of gender differences in moral judgment. In line with Gilligan's argument, a meta-analysis showed that males were more likely than females to have a justice orientation to morality, while females were more likely than males to have a care orientation; however, effect sizes for the gender differences were generally small (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000). Compared to men, women score higher on measures of empathy (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983) and show better aptitude in identifying with other people's emotions (Hall & Mast, 2008). Convergent with this, women expressed moral concerns about harm more than men, but also expressed moral concerns about unfairness and moral impurity more than men as well (Graham et al., 2011).

Gender has also been examined as a factor in moral judgments about hypothetical dilemmas pitting utilitarian (focus on maximizing consequences) against deontological (focus on

duties and actions regardless of consequences) concerns. For instance, in the oft-used trolley dilemma (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1985), the only way to save five people from being killed by a runaway trolley is to sacrifice another person, either by diverting the trolley onto a different track or directly pushing this person in front of the trolley to stop it. Greene's (2007) dual process model of moral judgment has suggested that the deontological judgment that such sacrifice is morally wrong primarily arises from affective reactions to the thought of killing, while the utilitarian judgment that such sacrifice is morally right primarily arises from more deliberative considerations of outcomes (Bartels, 2008; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Valdesolo & Desteno, 2006). Fumagalli and colleagues (2010) found that men were more likely than women to make the utilitarian decision to kill one person to save five, at least in cases where the required sacrifice involved an up close and personal action like directly pushing the person to his death. A meta-analysis of over 6000 participants confirmed this finding, and used process dissociation to show that women had stronger deontological inclinations than men, while men had only slightly stronger utilitarian inclinations than women (Friesdorf, Conway, & Gawronski, 2015). The authors conclude that "gender differences in moral dilemma judgments are due to differences in affective responses to harm rather than cognitive evaluations of outcomes" (Friesdorf et al., 2015, p. 696) -- in other words, women and men both deliberate about the consequences, but women have more affective reactions to the harm required in the action itself.

Judgments about the right course of action in moral dilemmas have been shown to vary by factors other than gender as well. Working memory capacity (used as an indicator of executive control more generally) has been shown to predict endorsement of killing some to save others when the fates of those to be killed were already sealed (Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008).

Within the US, social class impacts such judgments, with people from high social classes making more utilitarian decisions than those from lower social classes (Cote, Piff, & Willer, 2013). And people in collectivist cultures tend to also consider additional contextual information when forming dilemma judgments, such as whether or not it is one's duty or place to act in the hypothetical situation (An & Trafimow, 2013; Gold, Coleman, & Pulford, 2014). This use of trolley-type dilemmas in moral psychology -- so widespread it is commonly referred to as "trolleyology" -- has been critiqued for lack of ecological validity (Bauman, McGraw, Bartels, & Warren, 2014; Kahane & Shackel, 2010), and for the fact that utilitarian decisions are actually associated with some anti-utilitarian tendencies (e.g., more rational egoism, less charitable donations to distant others, less endorsement of impartiality; Kahane, Everett, Earp, Farias, & Savulescu, 2015), antisocial personality traits (Machiavellianism, sub-clinical psychopathy, and life meaninglessness; Bartels & Pizarro, 2011) and low levels of empathy (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013).

Moving closer, perhaps, to everyday moral disagreements, political ideology has emerged as an important individual difference variable in the study of moral judgment. Moral Foundations Theory (MFT; Graham et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt & Graham, 2007) attempts to merge evolutionary approaches to morality (Brown, 1991; de Waal, 1996; Joyce, 2006) with cultural models of moral diversity across societies (Fiske, 1991; Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997), identifying several intuitive foundations upon which cultures and individuals build their moral systems: Care/harm, Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Purity/degradation. Applying MFT to moral disagreements between liberals and conservatives, Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009) found using four different measures that liberals were more concerned than conservatives about Care and Fairness, while conservatives were more concerned

than liberals about Loyalty, Authority, and Purity. This ideological differences in moral foundation endorsement has been replicated across several different research labs using a wide variety of methods (Cannon, Schnall, & White, 2011; Federico, Weber, Ergun, & Hunt, 2013; Hirsch & DeYoung, 2010; Hoffman, Wisneski, Brandt, & Skitka, 2014; Lewis & Bates, 2011; McAdams et al., 2008; Smith & Vaisey, 2010; Waytz, Dungan, & Young, 2013), as well as across several different nations and world areas (Davies, Sibley, & Liu, 2014; Graham et al., 2011; Métayer & Pahlaven, 2014; Nilsson & Erlandsson, 2015; Van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Davis and colleagues (2016) replicated this ideology effect across different racial groups in the U.S., but found that the ideological differences were weaker among black participants than among white participants. Moral judgments about Purity are especially powerful predictors (over and above ideology) of variegated culture-war issue positions (Koleva, Graham, Iyer, Haidt, & Ditto, 2012) and social distancing in both social networks (Twitter) and in lab experiments (Dehghani, Johnson, Hoover, Sagi, Garten, Parmar, Vaisey, Iliev, & Graham, 2016).

Political ideology has also been associated with differences in moral regulatory focus, with liberals more focused on promoting the good and conservatives more focused on preventing the bad (Janoff-Bulman & Carnes, 2013; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008). Cornwell and Higgins (2013) related such chronic promotion and prevention concerns to the ideological differences in moral foundations (see also Cornwell & Higgins, 2014, on locomotion and control concerns explaining cases where liberals endorse Loyalty, Authority, and Purity concerns). Janoff-Bulman and Carnes (2013) proposed a Model of Moral Motives crossing approach and avoidance with intrapersonal, interpersonal, and intragroup contexts; for example, at the group level, promotion focus leads to social justice morality, while prevention focus leads to social order morality.

Ideological differences in moral concerns and values are a primary contributor to ideological migration, the tendency for people to move to areas containing others who are ideologically similar to them (Motyl, Iyer, Trawalter, & Nosek, 2014; Motyl, 2016). But despite the liberal/conservative differences in content of moral concerns and regulatory focus, in many ways people at the extreme ends of the political spectrum are more like each other than they are like people in the middle (Crawford, 2012; Skitka & Washburn, 2016; Taylor, 1960). For instance, both extreme liberals and extreme conservatives feel that their beliefs are superior -- factually and morally -- than those of their opponents (Toner, Leary, Asher, & Jongman-Sereno, 2013), and this can contribute to a general illusion that one fully understands political issues while others do not (Fernbach, Rogers, Fox, & Sloman, 2013). This can also help explain why moral and ideological diversities are not as strongly endorsed as other forms of diversity (Haidt, Rosenberg, & Hom, 2003; Inbar & Lammers, 2012; Duarte et al., 2014). Political extremists are the most likely to hold moral convictions, which are distinct from other attitudes in terms of their subjectively perceived objectivity and behavioral consequences (Skitka, 2010; Skitka, 2012; Skitka & Bauman, 2008; Skitka & Mullen, 2002). And extreme partisans are, unsurprisingly, the most likely to show political intolerance and prejudice toward those on the other side of the political divide (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2015; Crawford, 2012; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014; Morgan, Mullen, & Skitka, 2010; Valdesolo & Graham, 2016).

Cultural differences in moral judgments are receiving increased attention in 21st-century moral psychology. While some similarities have been established – for instance, honesty is consistently endorsed as morally important across cultures (Smith, Smith, & Christopher, 2007) – changes in cultural context can affect judgments of right and wrong in profound ways. For example, even the role of intentions in moral judgment (e.g. doing a harmful action intentionally

rather than as a side-effect, previously thought to be universally important; Mikhail, 2007) has been shown to vary substantially across cultures, in some cases having nearly no influence on moral judgments at all (Barrett, Bolyanatz, Crittenden, Fessler, Fitzpatrick, et al., 2015; see also Forsyth, 1985). Cultural differences can also be seen in the very ways that "moral" and "immoral" are defined: Buchtel and colleagues (2015) examined lay concepts of immorality in western (US and Canada) vs. Chinese cultural contexts, finding that while immorality is primarily conceptualized as harmful actions in the West, it is primarily conceptualized as uncivilized actions in China. While the vast majority of moral psychology studies are done using Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD; Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) participants, this is a radically unrepresentative sample of the human population, and the moral concerns of people from non-WEIRD cultures may thus not be well represented in the literature. In terms of Shweder's three ethics, WEIRD cultures tend to focus almost exclusively on the ethic of autonomy (including individual rights, independence, and freedom from harm), while non-WEIRD cultures emphasize the ethics of community (including duty-based communal obligations) and divinity (notions of sacredness and spiritual purity) as well (Shweder et al., 1997; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987; see also Guerra & Giner-Sorolla, 2010; Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). This can lead to different moral judgments about specific issues, for instance whether private sexual behaviors should be seen as a collective moral purity concern or as a matter of individual rights and privacy (Vauclair & Fischer, 2011; Vauclair et al., 2015).

Cultural differences in ethical systems can also influence the ways basic concepts such as fairness are conceptualized. While autonomy cultures tend to approach fairness as a matter of equity (distribute resources according to merit and personal effort), communal cultures tend to

see fairness more in terms of equality (distribute resources as equally as possible, to minimize suffering), leading to cultural differences in judgments of both actions and character (Vauclair, Wilson, & Fischer, 2014; van der Toorn, Berkics, & Jost, 2010; Wu et al., 2014). Such differences can even be found in young children: when asked to distribute rewards in a game between themselves and others, Western kids distributed according to effort equity, pastoralist kids distributed rewards equally regardless of effort, and hunter-gatherer kids took both equality and equity into account, leading researchers to conclude "fair is not fair everywhere" (Schafer, Hahn, & Tomasello, 2015).

Ecological factors can be an important source of cultural variation in moral judgments and values. For instance, pathogen prevalence predicts endorsement of loyalty, authority, and purity concerns, which may discourage behaviors leading to disease contagion (Van Leeuwen, Park, Koenig, & Graham, 2012; Van Leeuwen, Koenig, Graham, & Park, 2014). Similarly, exposure to high levels of threat (e.g., terrorism, natural disasters) produces morally "tight" cultures in which violations of moral norms related to cooperation and interpersonal coordination are more harshly punished (Roos, Gelfand, Nau, & Lun, 2015). Cultural variations in this moral tightness (rigidly enforced norms) vs. looseness (less rigidly enforced norms, more tolerance of deviance) have been shown both cross-nationally (Gelfand, Raver, Nishii, Leslie, Lun, et al., 2011) and across states within the US (Harrington & Gelfand, 2014). Antecedents of tightness (compared to looseness) include ecological and man-made threats such as natural disasters, lack of resources, and disease prevalence, and outcomes of tightness include higher social stability, incarceration rates, and inequality, and lower drug use, homelessness, creativity, and happiness. The related socio-ecological factor of residential mobility in a culture is associated with greater

preference for egalitarianism over loyalty when it comes to preferred interaction partners (Lun, Oishi, & Tenney, 2012; see also Oishi & Graham, 2010; Oishi, Schug, Yuki, & Axt, 2015).

Religion is one of the strongest cultural influences on moral judgments (Graham & Haidt, 2010), and in a large cross-national study of values religious values varied between nations more than any other single factor (Saucier, Kenner, Iurino, Malham, Chen, Thalmayer, & Shen-Miller, 2015). But religious values also vary hugely within nations and societies. For example, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews, all of whom coexist within many nations, differ in how much moral weight they give to impure thoughts versus impure actions, with Protestants more strongly condemning "crimes of the mind" like thinking about having an affair (Cohen & Rozin, 2001; see also Cohen, 2015).

Moralization, defined as a process "in which objects or activities that were previously morally neutral acquire a moral component" (Rozin, Markwith, & Stoess, 1997) or as "the convergence of a preference into a value" (Rozin, 1999), can itself be taken as an individual difference variable, with different people (or cultures) moralizing different issues or actions to varying degrees (Lovett, Jordan, & Wiltermuth, 2012). For instance, Rozin and colleagues (1997) contrasted people who were vegetarian for health vs. for moral reasons, finding that those who moralized their vegetarianism recruited disgust to a greater degree than health vegetarians, and avoided a wider range of animal foods. Relatedly, disgust was found to play a particularly strong role in the moralization of body and soul purity, a type of moralization more prevalent in lower-socioeconomic status individuals (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; see also Haidt et al., 1993). Moralization of harmless but norm-violating or taboo behaviors (e.g., consensual adult incest using birth control) is more common in individuals lower in cognitive reflection (Royzman, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014). The process of moralization can create widespread

changes in moral judgments about specific behaviors over historical timescales, such as increased moralization of smoking in 20th-century United States (Rozin & Singh, 1999).

And finally, people differ in how much morality defines their self-concept -- that is, in their moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). While moral traits are central to identity in general (Strohminger & Nichols, 2014; 2015), individual differences in moral identity have been shown to predict prosocial behaviors, in part because moral identity guards against motivated justifications of apathy or immoral behavior (Aquino & Freeman, 2009; Aquino & Kay, in press).

Situational Effects on Moral Judgment

Increased attention to the importance of individual and cultural differences in moral judgment was one force driving the field of moral psychology away from its 20th-century roots in the developmental study of moral reasoning. Another has been the increased application of long-standing theories in social psychology to understanding moral judgment. This synthesis has inspired a wealth of research demonstrating the flexibility of moral judgments in response to manipulations of situational context. These effects have generally focused on the ways in which manipulations of decision-makers' intuitions, reasoning, and motivations can influence moral judgments.

Haidt (2001) and Greene et al (2001) played a pivotal role in this shift. The Social Intuitionist Model situated the study of moral judgment within the large body of existing research investigating social judgment more generally. The principles of intuitive primacy, automaticity, motivated reasoning, and social influence formed the crux of Haidt's model and motivated researchers to explore the processes underlying moral judgments from these theoretical perspectives. Similarly, Greene et al's work offered a dual-process model of moral

judgment akin to classic social psychological models of persuasion (Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; for a current model see Cushman, 2013).

These papers allowed moral psychologists to build from existing theories and methods in social psychology. The provocative suggestions from Haidt and Greene's early work were both the underappreciated role of emotion and intuition, and the ways in which these processes interact with deliberative reasoning to shape moral decisions. Work testing these process models approached these questions by attempting to isolate and manipulate the effect of either intuitive or deliberative processes and showing how such changes impact moral judgments. Recent experimental research has revealed how subtle situational changes to emotional state, processing capacity and features of moral actions and moral actors can change the severity of moral judgments.

Haidt's Social Intuitionist Model predicted that moral intuitions (which include moral emotions) directly cause moral judgments, and Greene et al 2001 showed how differential activation in brain regions associated with emotional responding predict changes in moral judgment. These emotional responses can be triggered by features related to the moral decision in question (i.e. emotions "integral" to the decision being made) or by extraneous features (i.e. emotions "incidental" to the decision being made). Though research has supported the importance of both kinds of emotional responses, here we focus on support for the latter.

For example, Valdesolo and DeSteno (2006) showed how manipulations of incidental positivity alter moral judgment in the trolley dilemmas originally employed by Greene. Eliciting feelings of general positivity in participants by having them watch a brief clip from Saturday Night Live led to significantly increased tolerance of deontological violations in the footbridge dilemma (i.e. higher rates of willingness to push a large stranger to his death in order to save five

others). Under neutral conditions, participants' intuitive aversion to the thought of directly harming another decreases permissibility of deontological violations, but inducing positive affect tempers this aversion, increasing endorsement of harm. Increasing sensitivity to harm via manipulating serotonin levels has a similar effect on moral judgment (Crockett, Clark, Hauser & Robbins, 2010).

Follow up research has added nuance, showing that the influence of mood on judgment can depend on the decision frame (active vs. passive; Pastotter, Gleixner, Neuhauser & Bauml 2013) as well as the specific kinds of emotional states being induced. Strohminger, Lewis & Meyer (2011) showed the importance of differentiating between the effects of specific positive emotions on moral judgments by comparing the effects of the specific state of *mirth* (the positive emotion associated with humor) and *elevation* (the positive emotion associated with acts of virtue or moral beauty) on hypothetical moral judgments. Replicating previous work, mirth again increased the permissibility of deontological violations, but manipulating the state of elevation decreased the permissibility of such violations. This work highlights the importance of attending to the way in which specific emotional states influence moral judgment, as opposed to mere valence (c.f. Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Lerner et al., 2015).

The specific emotion that has received the most attention by moral psychologists interested in situational effects of emotion has been *disgust*. A large literature links the experience of disgust to moral judgment, the bulk of which demonstrates this relationship within the domain of purity violations (i.e. those that involve defiling or degrading the body or soul; Haidt & Graham, 2007; Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009). Other work has suggested that the influence of disgust might extend to other moral domains as well, such as fairness (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). Wheatley and Haidt (2005)

hypnotized participants to experience disgust in the presence of particular trigger words. Participants then read vignettes describing moral transgressions, half of which contained the hypnotic trigger word. Participants who read description of moral transgressions that included the trigger words, rated those violations as more severe than participants who rated identical moral transgressions that did not include the trigger word. Schnall, Haidt, Clore, and Jordan (2008) found that participants exposed to a disgusting odor ("fart spray") made more severe moral judgments than participants under neutral conditions. While most of this work has demonstrated how amplifying disgust increases the severity of moral judgments (Cheng, Ottati, & Price, 2013; Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011), other research has shown how tempering the experience of disgust decreases the severity of moral judgment. For example, participants who wash their hands after a disgust manipulation show less harsh moral judgments than participants who did not wash (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008). Though other research has found contradictory effects, showing that reminders of cleanliness make moral judgments more harsh (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011; Zhong, Strejcek & Sivanathan, 2010), calling into question the strength and direction of these effects (c.f. Landy & Goodwin, 2015; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2015).

Manipulations of other discrete emotional states prior to moral judgment show similarly strong effects. Watching an anger-inducing video (compared to a neutral or sad video) prior to reading about an ambiguously criminal behavior increased judgments of the perpetrator's intentionality and causal responsibility as well as willingness to punish the perpetrator (Ask & Pina, 2011; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998). The effect of anger on causal attributions for immoral acts extends to judgments of real-world events as well. Priming incidental anger increased causal attributions regarding the terrorist attacks on September, 11 2001 (Small,

Lerner, & Fischhoff, 2006). Manipulations of guilt influence moral judgments of the self, increasing perceptions of culpability and motivating the desire to cleanse and even punish the self (Bastian, Jetten & Fasoli 2011; Inbar, Pizarro, Gilovich & Ariely, 2013; Nelissen & Zeelenberg 2009; Lee & Schwarz, 2010). Finally, compassion induced for one individual can bleed over and influence moral judgments of another (Condon & DeSteno, 2011), and attempts to regulate manipulated compassion for others can influence belief in the universality of moral rules (Cameron & Payne, 2012).

Experimentally altering the ability of individuals to engage in reasoning about moral dilemmas has been another empirical strategy to demonstrate the influence of situational variables on moral judgment. Inspired by dual-process models of decision making, which emphasize the importance of the interaction between intuitive and deliberative processes in driving moral judgment (Greene et al 2004), researchers have employed methods such as cognitive load and time pressure to show how situational alterations of processing capacity and ability influence moral judgment

For example, research using hypothetical moral dilemmas has found that manipulating participants' ability to deliberate increases the influence of intuitive aversions to actions involving harm. Cognitive load decreases permissibility of deontological violations in hypothetical moral dilemmas (i.e lower rates of willingness to push a large stranger to his death in order to save five others; Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg & Nystrom 2008). Manipulating time available to respond to hypothetical moral dilemmas has a similar effect on judgment (Suter & Hertwig 2011). Shorter response windows decreased permissibility of deontological violations in dilemmas that require killing one to save many and in which the action was depicted as a means to an end (see also Paxton, Ungar & Greene 2012). Directing cognitive resources to other salient

concerns, such as mortality, has also been shown to decrease the permissibility of deontological violations (Tremoliere, De Neys & Bonnefon, 2012). Inducing cognitive reflection in participants, by having them complete the cognitive reflection test (CRT) prior to judgment, *increased* the permissibility of deontological violations (Paxton et al 2012). Time pressure also increases perceptions of victimhood across a range of moral violations (Gray, Schein & Ward, 2014), and influences the prioritization of particular moral concerns (binding vs. individualizing foundations; Wright and Baril, 2011). Cognitive load influences judgments beyond hypotheticals as well. In a study eliciting *in vivo* moral transgressions, participants judged a fairness violation either committed by themselves or another, and the discrepancy between judgments of self and other (i.e. hypocrisy) disappeared under load (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008).

Manipulating features of a moral actor or a moral action can also change judgment via their influence on the kind of reasoning people engage in. Moral reasoning, and consequently moral judgment, can be distorted when individuals are given a motivation to perceive an act, or an actor, as moral or immoral (Ditto, Pizarro, & Tannenbaum, 2009). Effects on judgment can be due to the intrusion of motivations on reasoning about an actor's causal responsibility, intentionality, or ascription of moral blame and punishment.

For example, individuals are generally more likely to judge that an individual possesses causal control over an outcome if they are motivated to blame that individual (Alicke, 1992). Judgments of intentionality for outcomes can be influenced by manipulating the moral valence of an action, with undesirable outcomes leading to greater perceptions of intentionality than desirable outcomes (Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen 2006). Holding a moral conviction selectively directs attention to potential negative consequences of an action and away from potential positive consequences (Ditto & Liu, 2011). The influence of motivation on reasoning and moral

judgment even extends to situations in which an actor causes no harm at all. Inbar, Pizarro and Cushman (2012) found that participants judge a target to be morally blameworthy when they perform actions that allow them to benefit from others' misfortune even if they play no causal role in bringing about that misfortune (e.g. betting that a company's stock will decline or that a natural disaster will occur). Finally, moral judgments change as a function of whether choice options are framed in terms of lives saved or lost, and on the order in which moral dilemmas are presented (Petrinovich & O'Neill, 1996; Rai & Holyoak, 2010).

Moral judgments are also sensitive to the social identities and characteristics of the individuals being judged as well as the relational context of the action under consideration. Manipulating the group membership of targets of hypothetical terrorist attacks influences reported endorsement of the unintended killing of civilians (Uhlmann, Pizarro, Tannenbaum & Ditto 2009), an effect that is moderated by the priming of patriotism. Judgments of others' transgressions are sensitive to even very subtle cues to group membership, such as minimal group manipulations (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2007). Target characteristics, for example age, influence participants' perceptions of human value (Landy, 2013), an effect that may depend on the framing of moral tradeoffs in terms of lives lost versus lives saved (Li, Vietri, Galvani & Chapman, 2010). Shifting the locus of attention to be on a perpetrator or a victim reduces victim blame for transgressions such as sexual assault (Niemi & Young, 2014).

The perceived mental states of actors (e.g. whether they are considered to be moral agent or moral patients) influences the degree to which targets are judged as capable of good or bad deeds towards others (Gray & Wegner, 2009) or as worthy of moral concern at all (Gray, Knickman, & Wegner, 2011). Focusing on a target's body decreases perceptions of moral responsibility but increases perceptions of sensitivity to harm (Gray, Knobe, Sheskin, Bloom &

Barrett, 2011). Other dimensions of mind perception, such as beliefs about the intentionality of an action or the impulsivity of an action, can also sway judgment. Intentional actions are judged to be worse than accidental actions (Cushman, 2008), though such patterns can differ in cases of brain damage (Young, Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, Hauser, & Damasio, 2010) and temporary manipulations of neural activity (Young, Camprodon, Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010). The influence of intentionality may also depend on the domain of the violation in question, with work showing that intentionality has a reduced effect for purity violations compared to solely harm-based moral violations (Chakroff, Dungan, Koster-Hale, Brown, Saxe, & Young, in press; Young & Saxe, 2011). Perceived impulsivity of an action influences blame, with blame mitigated for negative actions that are thought to be more impulsive (Pizarro, Uhlmann, & Salovey, 2003).

Manipulating the relational context surrounding a moral action changes the perceived meaning of moral violations. For example, framing policy positions on how to respond to hostage situations as either military or diplomatic changes public perception of their legitimacy (Ginges & Atran, 2011). Manipulating the social context of an action also influences beliefs about the operative moral principles relevant to judgment (Carnes, Lickel & Janoff-Bulman, 2015), as well as the implications such actions have on feelings of self-threat (Jordan & Monin, 2008). The same action can lead to different judgments depending on whether it occurs in relationships defined by communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching or market pricing (Fiske, 1991). Taboo tradeoffs are thought to occur when relationship contexts conflict, such as when an actor in a relationship defined by communal sharing (i.e. a relationship in which members have equal status and resources) acts in a way that is consistent with a market pricing

relationship (i.e. a relationship in which members are concerned about comparisons and exchange; c.f. Rai & Fiske, 2011).

This summary offers a snapshot of the research demonstrating the situational variables that influence moral judgment. Other work has shown a variety of related effects such as the influence of changing the locus of intervention (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007), manipulations of social connection (Lucas & Livingston, 2014), visual interference (Amit & Greene, 2012), evaluative focus (Bartels, 2008), kinematics of moral actions (Greene et al 2009) anticipated psychological costs of considering suffering (Cameron, Harris & Payne 2015), salience of moral rules (Broeders, van den Bos, Muller & Ham 2011) and feelings of power (Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010).

Person-Situation Interactions in Moral Judgment

Despite all that has been learned about cultural and individual differences in moral judgments, and situational effects on those judgments, surprisingly little is known about how these two classes of influences interact. In Snyder and Deaux's (2012) classification of social-personality conjunctions into bridges, combined territories, and ravines, moral judgment best exemplifies a ravine -- described as a research area "where the distance between fields has been substantial but where developmental opportunities exist" (p. 830).

A review of the "two streams" in moral psychology (Graham, Meindl, & Beall, 2012; see also Cronbach, 1957; Tracy, Robins, & Sherman, 2009) pointed out this problematic distance between them, and highlighted political ideology as one area where those streams are beginning to come together. For instance, interventions framing particular issues (e.g., environmentalism, gay marriage, military spending) in terms of specific moral foundations (e.g., fairness, loyalty, purity) have been shown to have persuasive effects for people depending on their political

ideology. Framing environmental issues in terms of purity (vs. harm) dramatically increased conservative support for environmental initiatives, but had no effect on liberal support (Feinberg & Willer, 2013). And framing military service in terms of fairness (vs. loyalty) increased liberal support for military spending, but had no effect on conservatives (Feinberg & Willer, 2015; see also Day, Fiske, Downing, & Trail, 2014).

Person-situation interactions have also been found between political ideology and disgust manipulations. At an individual difference level, conservatives are more disgust-sensitive than liberals (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 2009; Inbar, Pizarro, Iyer, & Haidt, 2012). Manipulating physical disgust via a bad taste in the mouth was shown to increase the severity of moral judgments, and this effect interacted with ideology such that the disgust manipulation had a stronger effect on conservatives than it did on liberals (Eskine, Kacinik, & Prinz, 2011). Similarly, manipulations of incidental disgust via non-gustatory means (dirty desk, fart spray) increased moral judgment severity for those higher in private body consciousness, but not those low in this trait (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). Other individual difference moderators important for the disgust-moral judgment effect include emotional differentiation (Cameron, Payne, & Doris, 2013), attentional control (Van Dillen, van der Waal, & van den Bos, 2012), disgust sensitivity (Ong, Mullette-Gillman, Kwok, & Lim, 2014), and mindfulness (Sato & Sugiura, 2014).

Another form of person-situation interactions in moral judgment can be found in studies that tailor their measures, manipulations, or operationalizations of morality for individual participants. This has been called a 1st-person approach, in that it assesses morality according to what participants themselves consider morally important (Frimer & Walker, 2008; Meindl & Graham, 2014). In contrast, most moral psychology studies use a 3rd-person approach, defining

morality ahead of time rather than shaping it according to individual differences among participants' views of morality. Researchers taking this 3rd-person approach have operationalized morality as bravery (Walker & Frimer, 2007), social activism (Colby & Damon, 1992), community service (Hart, Atkins, & Donnelly, 2006), volunteerism (Aquino & Reed, 2002), honesty (Teper, Inzlicht, & Page-Gould, 2011), and cooperation (Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010), to name but a few.

A "mixed" approach (Meindl & Graham, 2014) combining benefits of 1st- and 3rd-person approaches is also possible. For example, research on moral convictions tends to involve assessments of each participant's personal moral convictions regarding specific issues or actions (Skitka, 2010; Skitka & Baumann, 2008). In a related way, in their investigation of the neural correlates of admiration and moral elevation, Immordino-Yang and colleagues (2009) first determined for each individual participant where the emotional high point of the eliciting stimuli were, aiding their ability to assess moral emotions in the scanner by taking individual variation in the emotional reaction into account. This represents another promising developmental opportunity for moral psychologists to begin exploring interactions between individual differences and situational effects.

Cultural and Individual Differences in Moral Behavior

As noted above, moral behavior can be conceptualized and operationalized in many different ways (e.g. as honesty, charitable giving, or volunteering). Moral (and immoral) behavior has received less attention from the individual differences stream than has moral judgment. Nevertheless, several cultural and individual differences have been found for morally-relevant behaviors like cooperation, volunteering, charitable giving, helping, cheating, and lying (Dovidio, Piliavin, Schroeder, & Penner, 2006; Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Prosocial behavior was

one of the primary areas targeted by the situationist critique in the 1970s, leading Piliavin, Dovidio, Gaertner, and Clark (1981, p. 184) to conclude, "The search for the 'generalized helping personality' has been futile." However, just ten years later these same authors accepted that "despite the pessimism of earlier reviews of this area...a growing body of literature suggests the importance of individual differences in helping" (Dovidio, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991, p. 101).

Personality traits related to empathy have been shown to predict long-term volunteering of time and blood donation (Davis et al., 1999; Penner, 2002; Hart, Donnelly, & Atkins 2005). And measures of social responsibility have been shown to predict various helping behaviors (Berkowitz & Daniels, 1964; Staub, 1974; Staub, 1996). The "Big Five" personality factors (McCrae & Costa, 1999) have been linked to moral behavior, with agreeableness predicting cooperation (Ross, Rausch, & Canada, 2003) and volunteering (Carlo, Okun, Knight, & de Guzman, 2005; Graziano et al., 2007; Graziano & Tobin, 2009) and conscientiousness predicting blood donation (Ferguson et al., 2004) and (in combination with agreeableness) helping others at work (King, George, & Hebl, 2005). Openness to experience similarly predicts greater perspective taking (McCrae & Sutin, 2009). The cluster of traits predicting prosocial behavior, including empathy, social responsibility, agreeableness, and conscientiousness, have been called the "prosocial personality" (Penner, Fritzsche, Craiger, & Freifeld, 1995; Penner & Orom, 2010), including the two major factors of other-oriented empathy and helpfulness. On the immoral side, antisocial behaviors have been linked with individual differences in traits like Machiavellianism (Gunnthorsdottir et al., 2002), psychopathy (Blair, Mitchell, & Blair, 2005; Leistico, Salekin, DeCoster, & Rogers, 2008), narcissism (Kernberg, 1989), disagreeableness (Miller, Lynam, & Leukefeld, 2003), impulsivity/disinhibition (Cale, 2006), and low levels of empathy (Miller &

Eisenberg, 1988). Some studies suggest that personality differences in prosocial (or antisocial) behavior have biological bases, linked to serotonin (Crockett et al., 2008; 2010), oxytocin (Kogan et al., 2011; Kosfeld et al., 2005; Rodrigues et al. 2009), dopamine (e.g., Bachner-Melman et al. 2005), or vagus nerve activity (Eisenberg et al., 1995; Kogan, Oveis, Gruber, Mauss, Shallcross, Impett, et al., 2011).

Prosocial behavior involves not only the inclination to help, but the ability to do so; this latter aspect has been captured in traits such as personal efficacy (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997) and emotional control (Lopes, Salovey, Cote, Beers, & Petty, 2005). Attachment styles have also been linked to prosocial behavior (both motivation and ability), with secure attachment predicting helping behaviors, avoidant attachment negatively predicting helping, and anxious attachment predicting helping for self-interested reasons (Gillath, Shaver, & Mikulincer, 2005; Mikulincer & Shaver, this volume).

Men and women are differentially likely to engage in different *kinds* of helping behavior, with men more likely to perform dangerous or heroic acts (e.g., rescuing someone stuck on subway tracks) and women more likely to engage in long-term (and often unheralded) prosociality like caring for an elderly neighbor (Becker & Eagly, 2004; Eagly & Crowley, 1986). These gender differences are attributed to both physical differences and socialization: men are physically stronger than women and so more likely to be able to help in emergencies requiring strength, but men are also more likely to be taught that heroic helping is appropriate for them, while women are more likely to be taught that nurturant helping is appropriate for them (Diekman & Eagly, 2000; Wood & Eagly, 2002).

Social class is also a predictor of both moral and immoral behaviors. Compared to upper-class individuals, lower-class individuals are more generous, charitable, trusting, and helpful

(Piff, Kraus, Cote, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). On the flip side, upper-class individuals are more likely to steal, lie in a negotiation, cheat, break driving laws (e.g., running a stop sign), and behave unethically at work; this increased immoral behavior was in part attributable to upper-class people's favorable attitudes toward greed (Piff, Stancato, Cote, Mendoza-Denton, & Keltner, 2012). And a recent analysis of charitable giving (Brooks, 2007) received a lot of attention for showing political differences, with conservatives giving more to charity than liberals; however, these differences were attributable to differences in religious attendance, not uniquely predicted by political ideology. And indeed, trait-level religiosity (measured as either frequency of religious attendance or self-reported importance of religious beliefs) has been shown to predict prosocial behavior (Stavrova & Siegers, 2013). Though some types of religiosity appear to contribute to ingroup bias (Galen, 2012; Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010), recent research has primarily focused on the positive consequences of religious belief. Religious people appear to naturally act more prosocially (Norenzayan, Henrich, & Slingerland, 2013). Many explanatory mechanisms have been proposed for religious prosociality (Norenzayan, 2014), but from a social psychological perspective, promising explanations include the bonds and sentiments arising from communal activities such as ritual and synchronous movement (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Wiltermuth & Heath, 2009; Xygalatas, Mitkidis, Fischer, Reddish, Skewes, Geertz, & Bulbulia, 2013).

General preferences for different outcome distributions between self and others -- usually measured behaviorally via distribution decisions in economic games or social dilemmas -- are captured in the individual difference variable known as social value orientation (McClintock, 1978; van Lange, 1999; see also Frank, 1988). The three social value orientations most often observed are Cooperators, Individualists, and Competitors (Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; van

Lange & Visser, 1999). Individual differences in motives also play an important role in prosocial behavior. In Snyder's functional analysis of volunteering, six primary motives were identified that volunteering could help fulfill -- values (e.g., benevolence), social (strengthen relationships), understanding (gain new knowledge or skills), protective (reduce guilt), and enhancement (personal growth) -- and continued volunteering depends on whether the experience satisfied one or more of these motives (Clary & Snyder, 1991; Omoto & Snyder, 1995; Snyder, Clary, & Stukas, 2000; Snyder & Omoto, 2001).

Several large-scale interdisciplinary efforts have revealed cultural differences in moral behavior (see Henrich, 2015, for review). Nations low in measures of ingroup favoritism and uncertainty avoidance have higher rates of helping strangers, charitable donations, and volunteering time (Smith, 2015). People in highly "embedded" cultures (which focus on the extended ingroup, rather than individuals) are less likely to help strangers (Knafo, Schwartz, & Levine, 2009). Tax evasion is more common in Italy than in the UK, and lab economic experiments show that tax declarations were less honest in Italian students than in UK students (Lewis, Carrera, Cullis, & Jones, 2009). Similarly, robust differences in cooperation behavior (e.g., working together for mutual benefit) have been found between WEIRD and non-WEIRD cultures (Gachter, Herrmann, & Thoni, 2010), as well as between relatively similar industrialized countries (Gachter & Herrmann, 2009). This cross-cultural variability is sensitive to the costs associated with cooperating and with free-riding (benefiting from others' cooperation while not cooperating oneself). When punishment for freeriding is not a possibility, cultural differences in cooperative behaviors are substantially reduced (Gachter, Hermann, & Thoni, 2010). These differences are also reduced when cooperation is less personally costly (House, Silk, Henrich, Barrett, Scelza, Boyette, & Souza, 2013). There are also strong cultural differences in patterns of

reciprocity, including both positive reciprocation (rewarding others' cooperative behavior; Gachter & Herrmann, 2009), and negative reciprocation (punishing non-cooperating free-riders; Gachter et al., 2010; Balliet & van Lange, 2013). Cross-cultural differences in *anti*social punishment (the punishment of cooperators) appear to be especially pronounced. While in some countries (USA, Australia) antisocial punishment is exceptionally rare, in others (Greece, Oman) people actually punish cooperators as much as free-riders (Herrmann, Thoni, & Gachter, 2008; Gachter & Herrmann, 2009). Relatedly, third-party punishment (costly punishment made by an agent for an interaction in which they were not involved; Hoff, Kshetramade, & Fehr, 2011) is more prevalent in cultures with low social mobility and strong social ties (Roos, Gelfand, Nau, & Carr, 2014).

Various overlapping factors may account for these differences, including cultural norms, environmental and structural variables, and demographic and economic factors. Cooperation and punishment norms vary considerably across cultures, and these differences translate into meaningful behavioral differences. For instance, antisocial punishment appears to be especially pervasive in cultures that lack a strong norm of civic cooperation (Herrmann et al., 2008). Historical cultural traditions also shape moral judgments. Purity behavior is also strongly influenced by cultural norms. For example, because of their traditional emphasis on the face as a locus of public self-representation, Southeast Asians are more likely to physically cleanse their faces following a moral transgression in order to reduce guilt and negative self-judgment, whereas people from WEIRD cultures tend to cleanse their hands (Lee & Schwarz, 2010). But where do these norms come from in the first place? Research indicates that social-ecological factors – such as a community's staple crops (Talhelm, Zhang, Oishi, Shimin, Duan, Lan, & Kitayama, 2014) and population size (Henrich et al., 2010) – contribute to cooperation

differences because they alter the types of behaviors that are required for communities to thrive. There is also growing evidence that exposure to economic markets might contribute to moral differences, by increasing positive interaction experiences, thus encouraging more trust, and, ultimately, increasing cooperation (Henrich et al., 2010; Al-Ubaydli, Houser, Nye, Paganelli, & Pan, 2011). Cultural variation in moral behavior can also be traced, at least in part, to social institutions like kinship structures and economic markets (Henrich, 2015). For instance, higher indices of market integration (when prices of multiple goods follow similar patterns over long periods of time) predict more fairness in anonymous interpersonal transactions (Henrich, Ensminger, McElreath, Barr, Barrett, et al., 2010).

There is also evidence of moral differences between groups in the same nation or society. For instance, even within a single city, residential mobility (the frequency with which people change where they live) has been associated with less prosocial (and more antisocial) behavior (Oishi, 2010; O'Brien, Gallup, & Wilson, 2012). In terms of cooperation, though within-culture variability may be lower than between-culture variability overall, in the absence of threats of free-rider punishment, there appears to be even more variability within cultures than between cultures, likely due to considerable differences in punishment habits between cultures (Gachter et al., 2010).

Situational effects on moral behavior

The effects of situational variables on moral behavior are well understood and have been a central focus of social psychological research since its inception. Many of the seminal theories and findings in the field were a direct result of early researchers' belief that moral behavior is a function of not only the individual, but the environment in which that individual operates. Many of these theorists drew inspiration from the social and political turmoil of their time in an attempt

to demonstrate the power of the situation in shaping both moral and immoral behavior. Their research on topics such as aggression, conformity, obedience, power, compliance, deindividuation, anonymity, altruism, and prosocial behavior permeate the field's texts, and all attacked the idea that individual differences in moral behavior are consistent across situational contexts (e.g. Lewin, Lippit, & White, 1939; Milgram, 1963; Latane & Darley, 1970). Though these topics had not traditionally been categorized as the study of moral psychology per se, in retrospect they clearly fall within this domain of research.

Recent work in social psychology, experimental philosophy, and behavioral economics have built from this foundation and amassed an impressive body of evidence delineating the many features of situational contexts which can exert influence on moral behavior. These effects range from the emotional, to the peripheral, to the social, but all are united in their support for how even very subtle situational changes can affect prosocial behaviors like helping and giving, and antisocial behaviors like lying and cheating.

As with moral judgment, emotional responses play a significant role in shaping moral behavior (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Some of this work suggests that behavior becomes more self-interested when experimental manipulations force participants to rely on their intuitive responses by constraining their ability to deliberate. For example, researchers employing ego depletion manipulations have shown that exhausting resources of self-control limits participants' ability to resist temptation and increases unethical behavior (Ainsworth, Baumeister, Ariely & Vohs, 2014; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011). Similarly, time of day has been found to influence moral behavior, with unethical behavior increasing in frequency as time passes, and presumably, as cognitive resources deplete (Kouchaki & Smith, 2013). Manipulating available time in a cheating task shows similar effects, with an automatic self-

serving tendency increasing cheating unless time to decide is ample (Shalvi, Eldar, & Bereby-Meyer, 2012).

In contrast to these findings which posit reason and higher order faculties as necessary to stifle selfish and aggressive intuitive tendencies, recent research also suggests that cooperation and prosociality are driven primarily by intuitive responses, and that deliberation can undermine prosociality (c.f. Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). Experimental manipulations such as time pressure or distraction can also increase cooperation and prosociality in economic games (Cornelissen, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2011). For example, cognitive load increases generosity in dictator games, suggesting that under these circumstances participants are less comfortable with divisions of resources in which they benefit from inequity (Schulz, Fischbacher, Thöni, & Utikal 2014). Similarly, priming subjects to trust their intuitions increases contributions in economic games while both priming and instructing participants to engage in greater reflection decreases contributions (Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012).

These conflicting results show how reliance on intuitive responses can both drive behavior towards self or other-interested behavior. Other examples of this inconsistency include the effect of manipulating subjective experiences of power, with high levels shown to lead to both unethical behavior (Lammers, Stapel, & Galinsky, 2010), as well as a heightened other-oriented concern and generosity (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003), and manipulations of anonymity which can increase selfishness and cheating (Zhong, Bohns, & Gino, 2010), but also promote helping (Hirsch, Galinsky, & Zhong, 2011). These contradictory effects have led researchers to emphasize the importance of context in explaining what kinds of moral behavior intuitive responses predict (Hirsch, Galinsky, & Zhong, 2011; Yam, Chen, & Reynolds, 2014).

More specific emotional states shape moral behavior as well. Positive affect has long been found to increase prosocial behavior (c.f. Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988). Variables that elicit positivity such as good weather (Cunningham, 1979), uplifting music (North, Tarrant, & Hargreaves, 2004), positive memories (Rosenhan, Underwood, & Moore, 1974), eating cookies (Isen & Levin, 1972), and the smell of roasted coffee (Baron, 1997) all increase helping.

Researchers have demonstrated the influence of discrete emotional states as well such as gratitude, compassion and elevation. Experimental manipulations of these positive emotions largely show similar effects. Manipulating gratitude increases helping behavior, even toward third parties (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006), and also increase cooperative exchange in economic decision making tasks (DeSteno et al., 2010). Compassion elicited by being exposed to the plight of a confederate reduces aggressive behavior towards people who cheated on an experimental task (Condon & DeSteno, 2011). Meditation increases this compassionate responding to others. Participants who underwent extensive meditation training were more willing to give up their seats to a female confederate on crutches (Condon, Desbordes, Miller & DeSteno, 2013). These effects are interpreted as demonstrating how these socially oriented emotions are geared towards building long-term social and economic capital (DeSteno, 2009). Other positive emotions show similar effects, with experimentally induced elevation influencing willingness to volunteer and help with a difficult task (Schnall, Roper, & Fessler, 2010) and manipulated awe increasing generosity (Piff, Dietze, Feinberg, Stancato, & Keltner, 2015).

Though positive emotions seem to consistently increase prosociality, negative emotions have more mixed effects. Shame can predict more aggression toward romantic partners, and less subsequent conciliatory behavior from those partners (Tangney, 1995), but guilt appears to motivate reparative actions after transgressions. Several studies show how guilt increases

prosocial behavior geared towards repairing severed social bonds (De Hooge, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2007; Ketelaar & Au, 2003), or self-punishment geared towards motivating one's own better future behavior (i.e. Inbar, Pizarro, Gilovich & Ariely, 2013; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009). Embarrassment shows similar effects, with experimental inductions of embarrassing behavior shown to increase compliance with requests for help (Apsler, 1975). These kinds of emotions are all classified as self-conscious states, but effects of other negative emotions have also been documented. For example, disgust, but not sadness or anger, increases rejection rates of unfair offers in ultimatum games (Harlé & Sanfey, 2010; Moretti & di Pellegrino, 2010).

The most well-researched link between emotion and moral behavior has been the effects of empathy on altruism. Batson and Cialdini's classic empirical debate attempted to systematically identify the components of empathic responses which predict altruism, as well as the conditions under which such effects occur (e.g. Cialdini et al., 1987; Batson et al 1983; c.f. Batson, 1991). Batson argued that feelings of other-oriented concern for a suffering target motivates helping, while Cialdini countered that such effects were a result of a motivation to alleviate "personal distress" as opposed to relieving others' suffering. This back and forth ultimately demonstrated how both other-oriented and self-oriented emotional responses drive helping when in the presence of suffering, but subsequent work has shown the tenuous relationship between empathy and moral behavior by demonstrating links between its experience and potentially undesirable behaviors such as ingroup bias (Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011; Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader, 2006). Empathy can often drive helping towards identifiable individuals, at the cost of helping more widespread suffering (Cameron & Payne, 2011; Genevsky, Västfjäll, Slovic, & Knutson, 2013; Slovic, 2007; Small & Loewenstein,

2003). This has inspired a reinvigorated debate over the utility of empathy as a guide to moral behavior (c.f. Bloom, 2014; Zaki, in press; Zaki & Cikara, 2015).

Aside from emotional states, a variety of other contextual features influence moral behavior. In line with Asch's famous definition of social psychology, the actual, imagined or implied presence of others has been found to powerfully shape moral behavior. In addition to seminal work on diffusion of responsibility (Latane & Darley, 1970), researchers have demonstrated the impact of even subtler cues suggesting the presence of others and the observability of behavior. For example, participants are significantly more cooperative in lab based studies using behavioral economics paradigms when their decisions are observable (e.g. Rege & Telle, 2004). This effect extends to field experiments with real-world measures of cooperation. Manipulating the observability of signup sheets for an energy savings program in an apartment building significantly increased rates of enrollment (Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, & Nowak, 2013), an effect attributed to the importance of concerns about reputation in predicting prosociality. These effects hold even with subtler cues to observability such as the presence of images of eyes, which have been found to increase charitable donations and cooperation and decrease littering (Ernest-Jones, Nettle & Bateson, 2011; Haley & Fessler, 2005; Powell, Roberts, & Nettle 2012), and manipulations of the level of lighting in the experimental setting (Zhong, Bohns & Gino, 2010) . Finally, observers need not be human, as research on the effects of priming the perception of supernatural monitors on prosociality has shown (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007).

Manipulating social norms also drives moral behavior (Rand, Yoeli, & Hoffman 2014). This influence can drive individuals towards increased prosociality, as a result of being immersed in an environment which supports cooperation (Peysakhovich & Rand, 2016). But it

can also undermine prosociality. People cheat more after they see others cheat (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009). The relational framing of interactions matters as well, with contexts defined by market interactions undermining aversions to harming other entities (Falk & Szech, 2013).

Finally, a substantial body of research has shown how manipulating feelings about the self shape moral behavior. Moral licensing (or credentialing) refers to the phenomenon in which the frequency of immoral behavior is increased when confidence in moral self-image is high (c.f. Blanken, van de Ven & Zeelenberg 2015; Effron & Conway, 2015; Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010). On this account moral behavior is a means of self-concept regulation. Affirming a moral identity licenses participants to act immorally, but when identity is threatened moral behavior is a means of regaining self-worth (Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). The self-concept maintenance perspective also fits with experimental work showing that, if given the opportunity to cheat for gain, participants will do so but only in amounts small enough to avoid threats to their moral identity (c.f. Amir, Ariely & Mazar, 2008). This ability to hold a moral standard while simultaneously acting in ways that violate that standard has been a topic of interest in its own right. Moral hypocrisy appears to be driven by the ability for transgressors to justify the acceptability of their misdeeds and retain a positive self-image despite their actions (Monin & Merritt, 2012; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008).

Person-Situation Interactions in Moral Behavior

Although the person/situation ravine exists for moral behavior as it does for moral judgment, several important person-situation interactions have been found to predict both moral and immoral behaviors. One of the most prominent theories of prosocial behavior is Batson's (2011; Batson et al., 1981; 1989) empathy-altruism model, which proposed feelings of empathy as a primary cause of costly helping behavior. While this model set off a contentious debate

about whether such behavior is truly altruistic (Batson, 1987; Cialdini et al., 1987), at its heart it posits a person-situation interaction for prosocial behavior: those high in dispositional empathy will help regardless of costs and benefits, while those low in empathy will help only in situations where it is likely to benefit the self (e.g., if others are watching then the reputation benefits may outweigh the costs). Thus an individual difference variable (in this case dispositional empathy) moderates the effects of the situation on moral behavior.

Similarly, Penner's classic work on the prosocial personality (described above) has more recently been framed in a person by situation framework, with those high in traits associated with prosocial behaviors better able to resist situational effects preventing helping behaviors, as well as more likely to gravitate toward situations in which prosocial behaviors are more likely to occur (Penner & Orom, 2010). Agreeableness has been shown to predict prosocial behavior, and it also serves as a moderator for situational effects: for those low in agreeableness and prosocial motivation, attempts to situationally induce empathy can actually *decrease* prosocial behavior (Graziano, Habashi, Sheese, & Tobin, 2007).

Finally, the effects of religious cognition on moral and immoral behaviors also represent person-situation interactions: a recent meta-analysis concluded that priming religious concepts increases generosity and reduces cheating, though only among people who hold religious beliefs (Shariff, Willard, Andersen, & Norenzayan, 2015).

Future Directions

At a decade and a half into moral psychology's renaissance, the field shows no signs of slowing down any time soon. In this concluding section we specify likely areas of continued empirical investigation of moral thought and behavior, including further integrations of personality and social psychology approaches, increased study of the relations between moral

judgment and moral behavior, and expansions of moral psychology to include new methods, new samples, and even new phenomena.

Integrating personality and social psychology approaches to moral thought and behavior. For both moral judgment and moral behavior, the majority of research has been on situational factors, but individual differences in both have also been well explored. But as the preceding sections indicate, despite hundreds of empirical studies on individual differences in moral thought and behavior, and hundreds more on their situational determinants, relatively little is known about how these two factors interact. Person-situation interactions are likely to be particularly important for moral phenomena – both moral thought and moral behavior. In Deaux and Snyder's (2006) terms, how can we turn moral psychology from a ravine into a bridge?

One way, we suggest, is to increase the collaborations across different subfield silos within personality and social psychology -- and even within the subfield of moral psychology itself. For instance, there is increasing interest in moral judgment in the subfield of judgment and decision-making (see Bartels, Bauman, Cushman, Pizarro, & McGraw, 2015, for review), and this group of researchers presently has little overlap or even contact with those studying the influences of personality and character on moral judgments (e.g., Fleeson, Furr, Jayawickreme, Meindl, & Helzer, 2014; Meindl, Jayawickreme, Furr, & Fleeson, 2015). Such cross-subfield collaborations could also lead to fruitful combinations of methodologies, for instance incorporating experimental manipulations into ecological momentary assessment designs (Graham, 2014; Hofmann et al., 2014). One particularly promising area of investigation for person-situation interactions in morality is the consistency of situations people choose to be in (Sherman, Nave, & Funder, 2010). Are some people more likely than others to gravitate toward situations where there are more opportunities to help, or to lie, or to morally judge and gossip?

Answering such questions will require building personality-social psychology bridges among both methods and researchers.

Exploring the relations between moral judgment and moral behavior. The second major moral psychology ravine represented in this chapter is the one between studies of moral judgment and studies of moral behavior: both have flourished in the 21st century, but they have largely done so separately. Little is known about how much a person's moral concerns about fairness, for example, actually predict their own behaviors related to those concerns, such as cheating or reciprocating. A meta-analysis of studies containing measures of both moral judgment and moral behavior found that the size of the relationship was highly contingent on how the moral (or immoral) behavior was measured: stated behavioral *intentions* were moderately to strongly related to moral judgments, but retrospective reports of past behavior -- and, most importantly, directly observed behaviors -- were much more weakly related to moral judgments (Johnson, Wood, & Graham, 2016). Exploring when moral judgments and behaviors align, and when they do not, will be important for our understanding of moral character (Doris, 2003; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009), moral consistency (Meindl et al., 2015), and moral hypocrisy (Graham et al., 2015; Valdesolo & Desteno, 2008).

New methods, new samples, and new phenomena. It has been argued that methodological developments are as important (if not moreso) than theoretical developments for advances in psychological science (Greenwald, 2012), and this is likely to be the case for moral psychology as well. Methods like ecological momentary assessment (Hofmann et al., 2014) and the electronically-activated recorder (EAR; Bollich, Doris, Vazire, Raison, Jackson, & Mehl, 2016; Mehl, Bollich, Vazire, & Doris, 2015) are now just beginning to allow researchers to explore how moral judgments and behaviors play out in everyday life outside the lab (see also Mehl &

Conner, 2012). And given current attention paid to nonconscious and intuitive aspects of moral judgment (Haidt, 2001), use of implicit measures will continue to spread in moral psychology (Cameron, Scheffer, & Spring, in press; Cowell & Decety, 2015; Uhlmann, Poehlmann, Tanenbaum, & Bargh, 2011). And as moral neuroscience continues to grow (e.g. Chakroff et al., in press; Greene et al., 2008; Young & Saxe, 2011), some of the most widely-used implicit measures will continue to be psychophysiological and neuroimaging methods. Finally, given the rise of big data approaches in the social sciences, computational methods such as mathematical modeling (Cameron et al., in press; Crockett, 2015) and advanced text analysis (Dehghani et al., 2016; Johnson, Dehghani, Garten, & Graham, 2016; Boyd, Wilson, Pennebaker, Kosinski, Stillwell, & Mihalcea, 2015) are likely to become more common in moral psychology as well (see Hoover et al., in press, for a guide to big data analytics in moral psychology).

Most of what we know about human morality is still based on a tiny and extremely unrepresentative slice of humanity – namely, WEIRD college sophomores in elite research universities (Henrich et al., 2010; Sears, 1986). Studies of moral behavior (in most cases cooperative vs. selfish behaviors in economic games) have been central to recent attempts to reach non-WEIRD populations (Henrich, 2015), and such attempts are likely to expand to moral judgment as well (e.g., Saucier et al., 2015). And finally, despite all that has been discovered in moral psychology, we think it likely that new moral phenomena will continue to be demonstrated in future work. Rozin (2001; 2009) has called for more empirical psychological work demonstrating real-world phenomena -- or "here's what happens in the world" papers -- in addition to standard experimental papers refining existing knowledge about previously demonstrated lab phenomena. Human morality is messy, complex, and context-dependent, and new observations of phenomena involving real-world moral thought and behavior (such as moral

dumbfounding or moral licensing) are likely to continue. Combined with big data analysis techniques (e.g., text analysis of word co-occurrences over the history of the New York Times), investigations of changes in moralization over time (e.g., some sexual practices becoming less moralized, smoking becoming more moralized) could be a fruitful way to demonstrate real-world moral phenomena.

Conclusion. This is an exciting time for moral psychology, as personality/social psychology has eclipsed developmental psychology to become the primary disciplinary approach to understanding our moral nature. Moral psychology's findings are receiving widespread attention in both academia and popular press, and its methods and theories are being applied to diverse areas such as medicine, politics, and law. As illustrated in this chapter, the field remains divided, with ravines along two major fault lines – one dividing topics of investigation (moral judgment vs. moral behavior) and one dividing methodological approaches (individual/cultural differences vs. situational manipulations). Moral psychology will continue to thrive in the future, we expect, in large part by filling these ravines.

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